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Mobilizing theWestern tradition for present politics: Carl Schmitt’s
polemical uses of Roman law, 1923–1945
Ville Suuronen
Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity, and the European Narratives, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
This article offers a new reading of Carl Schmitt and his Nazi engagement by
chronologically examining the changing uses of Roman law in his Weimar
and Nazi thought. I argue that Schmitt’s different ways of narrating the
modern reception of Roman law disclose, first, the Nazification of his
thought in the spring of 1933, and second, the partial and apologetic de-
Nazification of his thinking in the 1940s. While Schmitt’s Weimar-era
works are defined by a positive use of Roman imagery, ranging from
Schmitt’s support to the Catholic Church to his endorsement of Benito
Mussolini’s ‘total state’ in Italy, Schmitt’s Nazi writings from 1933 to 1936
describe the reception of Roman law as an anti-German virus that must
be overcome by the Nazi movement. This shift mirrors Schmitt’s
transformation from an authoritarian thinker sympathetic to Italian
Fascism into a devoted Nazi. However, once Schmitt begins to see that
Germany will lose World War II, he recalibrates his position. While
Schmitt’s earlier Nazi writings offered a negative estimation of the
historical school of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, in his 1943/44 book on
European legal science, Schmitt portrays Savigny as the paradigmatic
European, whose work opens the path for a renewed legal science.
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1. Introduction: Carl Schmitt, ‘the Roman’?
The use of classical sources, both Roman and Greek, runs through the writings of Carl Schmitt like a
red thread.1 Drawing a direct relation between the classical past of the West and himself, Schmitt
would often refer to himself as a ‘Roman’2 and emphasize his ‘arcane love’ for the Latin language.3
As two of Schmitt’s close friends, Gerd Giesler and Ernst Hüsmert, recount: ‘When Schmitt often
referred to himself as a ‘Roman,’ he highlighted his affinity to the Latin-influenced cultural sphere.’
Schmitt’s self-proclaimed ‘Latinity’ had its roots in his catholic faith and upbringing, especially from
the side of his mother.4 As Giesler and Hüsmert also emphasize, to describe himself, Schmitt would
cite the Roman poet Ausonius, a fellow Moselaner: ‘My essence is slow, noiseless and yielding, like
that of a calm river, like the Mosel, tacito rumore Mosellae.’5 Although Schmitt, by his own
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Ville Suuronen ville.a.suuronen@gmail.com Pääskylänrinne 3c as 63, 00500 Helsinki, Finland (also my working
address during the corona pandemic)
1For a very useful (but incomplete) table of Schmitt’s references to classics, see Rink, Myrtenzweige, 183–6.
2Eg., Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 444. All translations in this essay are mine.
3Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 438.
4Giesler and Hüsmert, Carl Schmitt und Plettenberg, 2. For Schmitt’s own comments on his faith and its relativization through a
broad ‘humanistic upbringing,’ see Schmitt, Glossarium, 370.
5Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 10. On Schmitt’s self-description as a ‘Moselaner,’ see Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 18–20. On Schmitt
and Plettenberg, see Villinger, Verortung des Politischen.
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testimony, knew both Latin and Greek well,6 Schmitt had a particular affinity with Latin,
occasionally conversing in the language all the way until his late years.7
Schmitt’s affinity to the Latin language and cultural sphere was also reflected in the reception of
his works, which in its early stages found much resonance in Italy and Spain8 – the two states, which
under Mussolini, and, later, under Franco most closely modelled the kind of ‘qualitatively strong
total state’ that Schmitt would theorize and admire during the late Weimar years before joining
the Nazis. Schmitt also knew modern romance languages very well and spoke fluent French, Spanish
and Italian,9 of which the first he knew on the level of a native speaker.10
For a lawyer, the affinity to ‘Latinity’ and to Roman antiquity was of course a natural inclination,
given the tremendous influence that the reception of Roman law has had to some of the modern legal
systems of Western Europe.11 When Schmitt was asked in a 1971 interview about his university
studies, he emphasized this historical aspect, noting that even though he had initially wanted to
study philology, on the advice of his uncle he nevertheless ended up to the faculty of law:
I stayed there, found it wonderful, because it started immediately in the first semester with Roman law. Now,
that was for me a pleasure, Latin, and so on, that was a tremendous joy, Corpus Iuris – I found it incredibly
interesting.12
When Schmitt would often describe ‘the juridical way of thinking and speaking that has become
ingrained into my flesh and blood,’13 he was also referring to a certain history that his juridical
way of thinking necessarily carried with it. Schmitt’s famous statement from Political Theology,
that ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,’14
also discloses this fact. As Schmitt explains later in his Political Theology II, theology and jurispru-
dence ‘operated structurally compatible concepts’ and thus demonstrated a ‘systematic structural-
kinship.’15 It was this structure itself that formed a historical continuum reaching from the classical
past of Greece and Rome to Christian theology, and finally, to modern legal science. Schmitt’s life-
long interest in classical history was also an essential part in his friendships with such renowned
romanists and ancient historians as Álvaro d’Ors,16 Franz Wieacker,17 and Christian Meier,18
who all also greatly respected the quality of Schmitt’s works.
This article offers a systematic examination of the way Schmitt understands the meaning of
Roman law and narrates the story of its reception in his Weimar- and Nazi-era writings from
1923 to 1945. I argue that Schmitt’s constantly changing and ideological use of the history of
Roman law – its images, stories and symbols – opens a new way of understanding the development
of Schmitt’s thought from the 1920s to the end of World War II.19
I begin examining Schmitt’s changing use of Roman law and historical imagery in his Weimar-era
works by offering a close reading of Schmitt’s 1923 book Römischer Katholizismus und politische
6Schmitt, Glossarium 341.
7Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 566. On Schmitt’s preference for Latin cf., Schmitt, Der Schatten Gottes, 475; Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925
bis 1929, 437–8.
8On Schmitt’s reception, see Müller, A Dangerous Mind; Maschke, Der Tod des Carl Schmitt, 13–107. On Schmitt and Italy, see Schie-
der, ‘Carl Schmitt und Italien’. On Schmitt and Spain, see Saralegui, Pensador español.
9Schmitt, Glossarium, 341.
10Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 144.
11See Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte; Van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future; Stein, Roman Law in European
History.
12Hertweck and Kisoudis, Gespräch, 55.
13Schmitt, ‘Welt grossartigster Spannung’, 513. Schmitt always emphasized that he was primarily a lawyer. See Schmitt, Glossarium,
13–4; Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, 55. On Schmitt as a lawyer, see Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist.
14Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 49.
15Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, 77, 79n1.
16Schmitt and d’Ors, Briefwechsel.
17Erkkilä, The Conceptual Change of Conscience.
18‘Christian Meier im Gespräch mit Gerd Giesler’.
19However, my intention is not to argue that Schmitt’s thought would be nostalgic as Rudolf Smend does by referring to Schmitt’s
‘ancient conception of the state and antique-like point of view’ (Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 213).
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Form. While Schmitt initially deploys the vocabulary of traditions and the images of Rome in this
work in order to defend the European civilization against nihilistic Russian communism, after dis-
tancing himself from the Church in the mid-1920s, Schmitt begins to use this very same vocabulary
and imagery in a different manner. After becoming alienated from the Catholic church, Schmitt
begins to utilize these very same classical images in order to defend the tradition of the European
continental state, represented most intensively by Mussolini’s Stato totalitario.
Second, I explore how Schmitt’s Nazi writings from 1933 onward suddenly begin to utilize the
history of Roman law in an entirely new fashion. This essential transformation illustrates how and
why Schmitt abandons his Weimar-era ‘decisionism’ in favour of what he begins to call ‘concrete
order thought’ after he joins the Nazi party on the 27th of April, officially becoming a member on
May 1st 1933.20 I maintain that in distinction to the singularly positive uses of Roman law, history
and images in his Weimar-era works, Schmitt’s Nazi writings from 1933 to 1936 begin to portray
the German reception of Roman law as a deadly virus that is completely foreign to the German
spirit. By defending a true German way of thinking against the ‘foreign invasions’ of Roman
law and Western liberalism, Schmitt affirms the points 19 and 24 of the NSDAP party programme,
which demanded the replacement of Roman law with a ‘common German law’ and proclaimed
a struggle against the ‘Jewish-materialistic spirit.’21 Offering a new perspective to Schmitt’s Nazi
engagement from 1933 to 1936, I show that while Schmitt’s Weimar-era works were animated
by an admiration of Italian fascism and correspondingly by an overwhelmingly positive use of
Roman imaginary, the historical-political imagery that Schmitt uses to legitimate Nazi Germany
becomes decisively anti-Roman.22
Finally, third, I demonstrate how Schmitt’s use of Roman law once again changes during World
War II. Unlike Schmitt himself retrospectively claimed, he does not distance himself from Nazism
decisively and fully in 1936,23 but only during 1942/1943 after the war on the Eastern front has inevi-
tably turned into a loss for the invading German armies.24 This is most clearly apparent in Schmitt’s
book, The State of European Legal Science (1943/1944), in which Schmitt begins to describe the
reception of Roman law in an entirely new fashion. Abandoning his description of the reception
of Roman law as an anti-German infiltration, Schmitt now portrays the European-wide reception
of Roman law as the only possible basis for a common European legal science. While Schmitt’s
earlier Nazi-era writings had criticized Friedrich Carl von Savigny and his historical school, in
1943/44 Schmitt begins to describe Savigny as the paradigmatic European thinker. In this way,
Roman history and symbolics now gain new political and personal functions in Schmitt’s thought.
On the one hand, this history is mobilized to describe the potentials of a shared European legal
science at a moment when the Nazi invasion to the East is doomed to failure. On the other
hand, this shared European history is conjured up as an apologetic deus ex machina through
which Schmitt breaks away, although only indirectly and half-heartedly, from his earlier espousals
of Nazi-ideology.
This study takes its bearings from the notion that a selective use of historical images, symbols and
narratives can serve as an illuminating beacon through which it is possible to disclose and highlight
the fundamental changes in the more fundamental presuppositions and axioms at the heart of
20Cf., Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930–1934, 287; Hertweck and Kisoudis, Gespräch, 101; Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, 84–5.
21While the article 19 of the NSDAP party programme states that ‘Wir fordern Ersatz für das der materialistischen Weltordnung die-
nende römische Recht durch ein deutsches Gemein-Recht,’ article 24 emphasizes that Nazi-ideology ‘bekämpft den jüdisch-materi-
alistischen Geist in und außer uns’ in order to realize the fundamental principle of ‘Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz.’
22While Schmitt’s Nazi-engagement is analyzed by a great plethora of studies, none of them focuses on Schmitt’s changing uses of
Roman law and classical history. See, Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich; Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im dritten Reich; Koenen, Der Fall Carl
Schmitt; Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden; Blasius, Preussischer Staatsrat; Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 11–37; Mehring, Aufstieg
und Fall, 304–436; Neumann, Carl Schmitt als Jurist. Although this question receives some attention in the broader histories of
Nazi law, also these studies do not offer a sustained analysis of Schmitt’s uses of Roman law. See especially, Rüthers, Entartetes
Recht; Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht; Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts.
23Schmitt, Antworten in Nürnberg, 54; Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 548; cf., 436.
24This has been broadly recognized; Meier, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts, 255; Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden, 296; Mehring, Aufstieg und
Fall, 436; Kervégan, Que faire de Carl Schmitt? 11, 43, 231; Hell, The Conquest of Ruins, 420, 429; Suuronen, ‘Nazi Revolution’.
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Schmitt’s thinking.25 As the often neglected but crucially important opening sentences of the second
chapter of Political Theology elucidate, Schmitt always knew that theories and concepts must change
with major political events:
When constitutional theories and concepts are reconfigured under the impact of political events and changes,
so the discussion initially becomes influenced by the practical perspectives of the day and modifies the tra-
ditional notions (überlieferten Vorstellungen) according to some immediate purpose.26
Schmitt’s changing mobilizations of the history of Roman law for different political purposes in
different historical contexts exemplifies what this sentence means.
A number of previous studies have offered different perspectives on Schmitt’s relationship to
Roman law and antiquity. For instance, Kaius Tuori investigates Schmitt’s use of Roman symbolics
in the context of his early theory of dictatorship27 and Luigi Garofalo and Reinhard Mehring exam-
ine Schmitt’s 1943/44 text on European legal science.28 However, neither Tuori, Garofalo nor Mehr-
ing discusses the profound changes in Schmitt’s understanding of Roman law. Aiming for a more
comprehensive portrayal of Schmitt’s uses of classical antiquity, Annette Rink’s, Das Schwert Im
Myrtenzweige. Antikenrezeption bei Carl Schmitt (2000) studies Schmitt’s uses of Roman and
Greek sources in a work that operates at the borders of academic text and fiction. While offering
interesting insights, Rink leaves Schmitt’s most central legal historical writings from the Nazi-era
unanalyzed and thus offers a deficient picture of his most racist writings.29
Schmitt’s use of Roman imagery is also discussed in Andreas Koenen’s well-known intellectual
biography, Der Fall Carl Schmitt. Sein Aufstieg zum ‘Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches’ (1995) and
in Richard Faber’s collection of essays. Both portray Schmitt as a systematically Catholic thinker
from diametrically opposed perspectives. While Koenen establishes a dubious division between con-
servative revolutionaries like Schmitt, on the one hand, and real Nazis, on the other,30 Richard Faber
collapses all of Schmitt’s thinking into an unchanging mixture of Latinity, Catholicism and fascism.31
Neither Koenen nor Faber recognizes the crucial changes that take place in Schmitt’s political pos-
itions, which is directly reflected in his changing uses of Roman law in the 1930s and 1940s.
Most recently, Julia Hell’s work The Conquest of Ruins: The Third Reich and the Fall of Rome
(2019) vividly discusses Schmitt as a theorist of Roman imperial mimesis in the context of his inter-
national thought, focusing primarily on Schmitt’s Grossraum-theory and the concept of the Kate-
chon.32 Also Hell emphasizes Schmitt’s consistent ‘theological commitments’ and the continuity
of his decisionism. However, in distinction to previous studies, Hell emphasizes the antisemitic
25For examples of this kind of an approach, see how the changes in the use of such a seemingly meaningless word as ‘Geist’ actually
discloses Martin Heidegger’s path to Nazification and his later denazification (see Derrida, Of Spirit), or how the sudden appro-
priation of the discourse of human rights in the late thinking of Michel Foucault reflects the development of his later ‘ethical’
thinking (Goulder, Foucault and the Politics of Rights). In the case of Schmitt himself, see how his changing use of the metaphor
of the ‘Zwischenzustand’ illuminates the broader lines of development of his thought; Pankakoski, ‘Intermediate State.’
26Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 25.
27Tuori, ‘Schmitt and the Sovereignty of Roman Dictators.’ Although, as Tuori clearly shows, Schmitt’s 1919 book on dictatorship is
very central to Schmitt’s understanding of the meaning of Rome, I will not analyze this work in detail in this essay. In distinction to
the narrower gaze of the legal historian that Schmitt applies in Die Diktatur (1921) Schmitt’s 1923 book on Roman Catholicism not
only repeats the central historical arguments present in Schmitt’s theory of the dictatorship, but also expands them into a more
general cultural-historical narrative. This reflects my broader methodological focus: Instead of analyzing the development of
Schmitt’s singular concepts that have their roots in Roman law, I will focus primarily on analyzing Schmitt’s broader historical
narratives concerning the meaning and the reception of Roman law and how these narratives change in the different periods
of his career.
28Garofalo, ‘Carl Schmitt e la “Wissenschaft des römischen Rechts”.’; Mehring, ‘Carl Schmitts Schrift “Die Lage der europäischen
Rechtswissenschaft”.’
29Rink, Myrtenzweige, 18–20.
30Koenen, Der Fall, 728. Koenen grounds this problematic argument on Armin Mohler’s Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland
1918–1932 (1949) (see, Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 6). The recent publication of Schmitt’s diaries from the 1920s and 1930s has
clearly demonstrated that Koenen’s (and Mohler’s) description of Schmitt as a part of this supposed broader conservative school
of thought has no grounding in either Schmitt’s biography or his publications.
31Faber, Lateinischer Faschismus.
32Hell, The Conquest of Ruins, 401–30.
4 V. SUURONEN
nature of Schmitt’s thinking.33 Although Hell’s analysis of the Roman symbolics at the heart of
Schmitt’s Grossraum-thinking and theory of the Katechon is often convincing, also Hell describes
Schmitt as a systematically Catholic thinker and does not analyze the way Schmitt’s uses of
Roman law evolve.34
In a critical discussion with these studies, this article examines in detail how Schmitt’s use of
Roman law and classical imagery develops from 1923 to 1945; first, from the publication of
Schmitt’s Römischer Katholizismus to his theory of the total state, and second, from Schmitt’s
analyses of the 1933 Nazi Revolution to his 1943/1944 book The State of European Legal Science.
In distinction to the previous studies, I argue that Schmitt cannot be portrayed as a systematically
Catholic thinker.35 Most importantly, the year 1933 represents a genuine cesura in Schmitt’s
thinking. For Schmitt, the Nazi seizure of power is a true revolution that forces and allows
him to confront ‘the difficult task of rethinking and recultivating traditional concepts,’ as Schmitt
constantly repeats with a revolutionary ethos in numerous writings published after the
Machtergreifung.36
In analyzing Schmitt’s changing uses of classical images, narratives and symbols, it is crucial to
remember that Schmitt operated polemically within broader academic discussions.37 Just as the phi-
losopher Martin Heidegger and the political theorist Hannah Arendt would perform different
returns to and retrievals from the Greco-Roman antiquity,38 a great plurality of German legal the-
orists and historians were engaged in rethinking the Western heritage from the perspective of legal
history and theory. Among them were thinkers sidelined by the Nazis like Paul Koschaker and those
who made careers within the party, like Franz Wieacker.39 It is obvious that when Schmitt is discuss-
ing ancient sources in his writings, he is also, often implicitly, participating to these wider discussions
concerning the faith of Europe and its shared history and traditions. I will examine this broader his-
torical context of Schmitt’s arguments to the extent that it is essential for understanding his argu-
ments. In the following section, I will begin analyzing Schmitt’s uses of the classical past by
investigating his Weimar-era writings.
2. Schmitt’s deployment of Roman imagery in the Weimar-era: from the Church to
the total state
Schmitt’s 1923 book Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form offers a detailed narrative of
the Catholic Church as the contemporary bearer of European traditions and Roman universalism.
Schmitt begins his book with a striking sentence: ‘There is an anti-Roman affect.’40 As he
explains, Rome is nothing less than an ‘image’ (Bild) with a ‘mythical power.’ The image of
Rome has ‘nourished’ various political battles by providing them with a ‘mythical arsenal.’
Whole generations of pious protestants and orthodox Christians have seen in the image of
Rome the incarnation of the anti-Christ or the embodiment of the whore of Babylon; both them-
selves mythical images of disorder, chaos and imperial evil. Modern politicians from Gladstone,
33Ibid., 410, 426–7. Hell relies broadly on Gross, Carl Schmitt und die Juden. As we will see, Gross’s thesis of Schmitt’s unchanging
antisemitism is also too straightforward.
34Ibid., 404–7.
35Beyond the works mentioned above, the description of Schmitt as a Catholic has been defended notably by Meier, Die Lehre Carl
Schmitts. On the clear discontinuities of Schmitt’s Catholicism, cf., Mehring, ‘Catholic Layman’; Suuronen, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique
of Biotechnology and Utopias.’
36Schmitt, ‘Über die neuen Aufgaben der Verfassungsgeschichte’, 264. On Schmitt’s revolutionary ethos, see Suuronen, ‘Nazi Revo-
lution’; Blasius, Preussischer Staatsrat, 12, 111; Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 309–10, 340–7, 380; Quaritsch, Positionen und Begriffe
Carl Schmitts, 79.
37Eg., Hewitson and D’Auria, Europe in Crisis; Tuori and Björklund, Roman Law and the Idea of Europe.
38For a general depiction of such attempts in the twentieth century see Strong, Politics without Vision. For a detailed elaboration of
Heidegger’s reading of the tradition that, in distinction to Schmitt’s legal historical narratives focused on Rome, takes its bearings
from Greek philosophy, see Backman, Complicated Presence.
39Cf., Beggio, Paul Koschaker; Tuori, Empire of Law.
40Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und Politische Form, 5.
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Bismarck and Cromwell to writers like Dostoyevsky were united, although to different degrees, in
their anti-Roman horror.41
With equal ferocity and mythical strength, the political image of Rome has also ‘nourished’ posi-
tive political energies and identities. According to Schmitt, the best proof for the ‘continuity of the
catholic Church and Roman Empire’ is that Catholicism has animated equally the historical and phi-
losophical constructions of both the opponents and supporters of the Church; that of the philoso-
pher of Action Française, Charles Maurras, the race theorist Houston Stewart Chamberlain as
well as the thinking of Max Weber and Dostoyevsky.42 Schmitt describes the catholic Church as a
complexio oppositorum; a unique institution of ‘astounding elasticity’ that is able to both animate
political battles on all sides and to incorporate within its ideological corpus the most different doc-
trines, peoples and ideas.43 Although Schmitt has not yet explicitly formulated his thesis of the pol-
itical, it is obvious to any perceptive reader that already his 1923 book presents the image of Rome as
nothing less than a mythical mirror that both nourishes and discloses various friend/enemy-
distinctions.44
Schmitt also appreciates the Church for its ability to realize the political idea of representation.
That the Church has been able to function as a point of self-identification to a plurality of political
movements is inextricably related to its historical position and role as a ‘historical complex and
administrative apparatus’ that carries forward the ‘universalism of the Roman Empire.’45 As Schmitt
puts it, the Catholic Church is the ‘bearer of the juridical spirit and the true heir of the Roman law’46
and the institution in which ‘the Roman rationalism continues to survive (weiterlebt)’47 This ration-
alism ‘lies in the institutional [form] and is essentially juridical ( juristisch)’; it is defined by the
‘capacity to juridical form.’48 The organization of the Church is ‘eminently political’ because its con-
ception of life is based onmore than mere economic calculations; on the realization of its own meta-
physically grounded worldview.49 As an institution, the Church exemplifies the fact that ‘the idea
belongs to the political, because there is no politics without authority and no authority without
the ethos of conviction.’50 As the leader of the Church and all of Christendom, the pope is the
‘vicar of Christ’ (Stellvertreter Christi) and the lineage of his office can be traced back all the way
to Christ himself.51
Schmitt’s veneration of Catholicism and his description of the Church as the bearer of European
‘civitas humana,’52 has a directly political purpose. Schmitt locates the enemies of the Church to lib-
eralism and communism. Mobilizing the vocabulary of ‘traditions’ and the imagery connected to
Rome to the level of contemporary political battles, Schmitt argues that both liberalism and com-
munism equally threaten the Church as the bearer of European traditions: ‘The big industrialist
has no other ideal than Lenin has, namely an “electrified earth.” Both ultimately argue only about
the right method concerning the electrification.’53 Liberalism and communism are metaphysically
similar because both actively deny the idea that politics must always be grounded on transcendental
values. Unlike liberalism and communism that merely give ‘recipes for the manipulation of matter,’













53Ibid, 22, cf., 29.
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direction’ to the ‘irrational darkness of the human soul.’54 It is from this ‘pretension’ to be more than
mere mechanics, consumption and materiality that the Church derives its specific demand for ‘val-
idity and authority.’55
Schmitt then concludes his work by drawing the lines between the European civilization and the
new kind of active nihilism that defines communism. Referring to Giuseppe Mazzini, Schmitt hopes
to unify Europeans through a common enemy; the actively nihilistic Russia.56 What both Christians
and liberals must realize, Schmitt implies, is that the rising proletariat in Europe and the ‘Russentum
that is turning itself away from Europe,’ are, also in their own self-understanding, anti-traditional
‘Barbarians,’ who threaten to eradicate European traditions and culture.57 In this great political battle
the Church must choose its side just as it had chosen to support the anti-Enlightenment tendencies
in the previous century. In the twentieth century, the Church and its ‘concept of humanity’ must
defend its own specific political ‘idea’ and ‘West-European civilization’ against the anarchistic Rus-
sians.58 In this rather ingenious fashion, Schmitt manages to both criticize liberalism radically and
yet also envision a potential way of overcoming its deeply anti-political nature through the image of a
common enemy.59
However, as we know today, Schmitt’s celebration of Catholicism in the realm of the political did
not last very long. By the mid-1920s, Schmitt becomes alienated from Catholicism both personally
and politically.60 In distinction to his 1923 pamphlet, by early 1925 Schmitt already refers to himself
as a ‘catholic layman’ (katholischer Laie) in his notebooks and declares that even though he is ‘a son
of the Roman-Catholic Church,’ he is nevertheless ‘not obliged to remain a child my whole life… I
grow and become an adult… sors de l’enfance.’61 As Schmitt distances himself from the Catholic
Church, he also begins to distance himself from the historical interpretation that was inextricably
attached to his interpretation of the political relevance of the Church. Schmitt’s alienation from
the Church is reflected in the mirror of Roman imagery. While Schmitt still emphasizes the connec-
tion between Catholicism and Rome in a 1924 letter to his fellow constitutional lawyer Rudolf
Smend,62 only a few years later Schmitt has already grown much more ambivalent in his judgment,
writing in his notebooks that ‘the last and best formulation for the power of the Roman Church
remains the sentence of Hobbes: the pope is the specter that haunts (umgeht) the grave of Imperium
Romanum.’63 Although the change is small, it is still noticeable: The Church is no longer the self-evi-
dent bearer of theWestern tradition, but merely circulates around the tombstone of Rome, around its
mythical imagery.
Descriptively, as Schmitt’s self-distancing from the Church develops further, Schmitt asks in
another notebook entry from 1926 ‘Is the era of Rome at its end?’ without providing a direct
answer.64 However, still during the same year, Schmitt indeed provides an answer to his own ques-
tion, when he writes to his friend, the author and literary critic Franz Blei that ‘the era of Rome has






59It is thus too hasty to collapse Schmitt’s arguments to a variant of the German Zivilisationskritik as is sometime done; Richard
Wolin, “The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus”; Hell, The Conquest of Ruins, 406. As Schmitt’s student Armin Mohler rightly
emphasizes, what distinguished Schmitt from the average ‘conservative revolutionary’ of the Weimar-era, is precisely the fact
that Schmitt virtually never positively cites Friedrich Nietzsche, who laid the foundations for the German civilizational discourse;
Mohler, ‘Carl Schmitt und die ‘Konservative Revolution’. On Schmitt’s radical opposition to Thomas Mann, one of the central
representatives of Weimar-era civilizational discourse, see Mehring, ‘Der ‘Gross-Verwerter’’.
60Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 184–5; Mehring, ‘Catholic Layman’.
61Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 342.
62Schmitt and Smend, Briefwechsel 1921–1961, 27.
63Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 414.
64Ibid., 350.
65Schmitt’s words are recounted by Blei, Briefe an Carl Schmitt, 68.
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 7
that he had hoped for and envisioned in 1923 discloses itself as a mere momentary delusion, since
even ‘the preliminaries’ of a Christian culture are ‘missing’ from contemporary Europe.66
Although Schmitt gradually distances himself from the Church, it is important to emphasize that
this certainly does not amount to a wholesale abandonment of the whole discourse concerning Wes-
tern traditions and the classical past. Rather, the vocabulary of traditions is transposed to another
arena: The arena of the continental European state. This is reflected especially clearly in Schmitt’s
growing respect for Italian fascism and its ‘qualitatively strong total state,’ which in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, as Mehring notes, becomes Schmitt’s ‘model for the restauration of statehood.’67
In an especially interesting entry to one of his notebooks, Schmitt describes this change in
terms of the ‘anti-Roman affect’ that now gains an entirely new interpretation:
The anti-Roman affect is today no longer at all directed so strongly against the Church (it would be a delusion, if
she [the Church] believed that it was, and a fraudulent overestimation, since she [theChurch] is burocratized), but
against fascism, dictatorship, Caesarism, that is, against every true state. Rome = state. Pacifism =Neutralism.68
Schmitt clarifies the meaning of this new anti-Roman affect in his 1929 review essay of Erwin Beck-
erath’s book Wesen und Werden des faschistischen Staates (1927). In this text, Schmitt now joins in
the large number of ideologists who utilized the fascist discourse of Romanità and aimed to portray
fascist Italy as the contemporary inheritor of ancient Rome.69 Just as Mussolini himself would
declare that ‘the Roman tradition’ was nothing less than ‘an ideal of force in action,’70 against the
weak Republic of Weimar, Schmitt now celebrates the fact that ‘the fascist state, with an ancient hon-
esty (antiker Ehrlichkeit), will once again be a state.’ Schmitt emphasizes that this ‘strong feeling of a
connection with antiquity is not only decoration’ but must rather be understood as a concrete
defense of the European tradition of statehood, which is itself a ‘classical image.’71 While in 1923
Schmitt drew a distinction between a common European civilization and Russia, he now transforms
this distinction into one between Italian fascism that recognizes with an ‘ancient simplicity
(mit antiker Simplizität)’ the ‘concrete plurality of peoples and nations’ and between the ‘ideologi-
cal-abstract-ghostlike monism’ that is at heart of the violently globalist worldview of communism.72
The image of the shared Christian Europe is abandoned in favour of a defense of a plurality of
national traditions, the latter being exemplified by Italy and her mythical espousal of the Roman
heritage. It is in this sense that the ‘anti-Roman affect’ is now mobilized ‘against fascism, dictator-
ship, Caesarism’ by Italy’s enemies.73 If in 1923 the anti-Roman affect meant, politically speaking,
to position oneself against Catholicism, in 1929, to be against Rome means to be against fascist
Italy, the most exemplary realization of a strong state in Europe. If in 1923 one resisted the Church
by resisting Rome, in 1929 one resists the state by resisting Rome.
As Cosimo Cascione notes, despite of exceptions like the historian Ettore Pais and the romanist
Pietro de Francisi, most of the authors who theorized Italy’s classical Roman heritage never
attempted at providing any kind of a ‘serious confrontation with classical culture and its tradition’
but were rather content in dealing with this matter based on ‘intuition’ and by creating ‘a superficial
and a ritual connection of past grandeur and (alleged) present glories.’74 As Wolfgang Schieder
emphasizes, also Schmitt’s understanding of the political realities of fascist Italy were largely
based on such assumptions.75 This is also reflected by the fact that Schmitt’s use of classical history
66Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 491.
67Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 242.
68Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 487.
69See for instance Cascione, ‘The idea of Rome’.
70Mussolini, The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism, 25.
71Schmitt, ‘Wesen und Werden’, 130. However, it is important to note that according to Schmitt, the state was a ‘concrete concept
bound to a historical epoch’ – the epoch of modernity (Schmitt, ‘Staat als ein konkreter’). Schmitt explicitly criticizes the romanist
d’Ors for an anachronistic use of the concept of ‘state’ in his historical studies (Schmitt and d’Ors, Briefwechsel, 89).
72Schmitt, ‘Wesen und Werden’, 130.
73Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 487.
74Cascione, ‘The Idea of Rome’, 133–4.
75Schieder, ‘Carl Schmitt und Italien’, 14–21.
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changes crucially when he aligns himself with the Nazi party and its revolutionary forces in the
Spring of 1933.
3. The Nazi Revolution in legal science: Schmitt’s battle against Roman law and
liberalism from 1933 to 1936
Schmitt’s friend Franz Blei found it hard to believe that such a well-read man like Schmitt could join
the Nazi party. Drawing an interesting contrast between Carl Schmitt the ‘Roman’ and the well-read
‘humanist’ whom Blei had known in the early 1920s, on the one hand, and the later Carl Schmitt,
who joined the Nazis, on the other, Blei wonders in an essay published in 1940:
How could this Roman, Rhenish, fully unromantic Catholic, who wrote the classical work ‘Roman Catholicism
and political form,’ succumb to the Leviathan of the state?…How could this contemplative, calm, weinfrohe
man, who saw in his Rhenish homeland and its Romanity and Christianity the fulfillment of humanism, suc-
cumb to such a noisy berserker-Germanness?76
While one could simply argue that Blei had failed to understand the way Schmitt had distanced him-
self from the Church and therewith from the traditions it represented, there is a deeper point to Blei’s
contrast between Schmitt’s early ‘Latinity’ and his later Nazism. As Hans Frank, the leading Nazi
Lawyer on whom Schmitt’s career in the party depended,77 announced in an article from April
1933, published in Völkischer Beobachter, one of the central aspects of future Nazi law was to be
a decisive turn from Roman Law to a ‘German Law’ that would be accompanied by the creation
of a new faculty for racial science.78 In this negative sense, it was not only the French Revolution
that was performed ‘in Roman costume and with Roman phrases,’ as Karl Marx had famously
observed decades earlier.79 This turn against the reception of Roman law that had been announced
already in the article 19 of the Nazi party programme from 1920 constituted one part in the com-
prehensive retelling of world history that the Nazi movement was now pushing through in all
spheres of life.80
While there are some studies that analyze Schmitt’s retelling of modern German history in his
early Nazi-era writings81 and others that engage Schmitt’s fierce battle against the liberal concept
of the Rechtsstaat,82 Schmitt’s attack against the reception of Roman law between 1933 and 1936
remains a topic that has not been analyzed in detail.83 In fact, virtually all studies on Schmitt and
Nazism presuppose that the Nazi ‘deconstruction of the state horrified Carl Schmitt, who with his
firm grounding in Roman law, Catholicism and pontifical summa potestas, remained very Latin
in this regard.’84 However, this interpretation is not supported by Schmitt’s Nazi-era writings. Tack-
ling this subject in detail, I will argue in this section that Schmitt develops a detailed historical nar-
rative about the ‘spiritual subjugation’ of Germany,85 which not only aims to retell the modern
history of Germany but also the way Roman law was uncritically received by German lawyers
and liberals. I demonstrate how Schmitt’s narrative concerning the reception of Roman law forms
an essential part of his self-proclaimed ‘struggle of concepts (Kampf der Begriffe)’ that aims to purify
76Blei, Zeitgenössiche Bildnisse, 21; cited in Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 315.
77Blasius, Preussischer Staatsrat, 170–80; Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 373.
78Gräfin von Lösch, Der nackte Geist, 188.
79Marx, Der Achtzehnte Brumaire, 2.
80On the revolutionary historical imaginary of the Nazis, see especially Dennis, Inhumanities; Chapoutot, Le nazisme et l’antiquité;
Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order; Chapoutout, La révolution culturelle nazie; Chapoutot, The Law of Blood; Hell, The Conquest of
Ruins.
81Eg., Blasius, Preussischer Staatsrat, 128–51; Smeltzer, ‘‘Germany’s Salvation’’.
82Eg., Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, 330–8; Meierhenrich. The Remnants of the Rechtsstaat, 95–158.
83For general treatments of legal history and Roman law under Nazi rule (in which Schmitt is mentioned in passing), see Stolleis,
Recht im Unrecht, 57–93; Stolleis, ‘Römisches Recht und Rassengesetze’.
84Chapoutot, The Law of Blood, 115.
85Schmitt, ‘Die Logik der geistigen Unterwerfung’,.
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Nazi legal science from foreign concepts.86 As Schmitt puts it, it was of crucial importance that the
process of ‘co-ordination’ (Gleichschaltung) would also reach historical depths and reform the words
of legal language itself.87
In 1933 Schmitt instantly realized that the Nazi Revolution constituted a revolutionary moment
that would necessitate a profound historical revisionism. In Staat, Bewegung, Volk (1933), Schmitt
declares that ‘the past obtains its light from the present and all perceiving spirit is present spirit.’88
In a particularly symbolical move, Schmitt now emphasizes that Nazism must be understood as a
break from the Christian-Roman traditions represented by the Church. Nazi-ideology fiercely rejects
and negates the Christian idea of representation and its image of the political relation as a relation
constituted by the shepherd and his flock. The Führer does not represent anything; he incarnates,
without any artificial separation and distance required by representation, the immediate will of
the German people as a racial community.89 That nothing could be more wrong than to describe
the racist Nazi ideology as the bearer of Roman-Christian universalism was clear to Schmitt already
long before he joined the Nazi party in 1933. Schmitt’s notebooks from the 1920s record his readings
of Arthur de Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–1855), which, as Schmitt
notes, already attacked the universalistic heritage of Rome and the traditions of the Enlightenment.90
As Schmitt highlights in his 1935 essay on ‘Legal science in the Führer-state,’ the Nazi revolution
must retell legal and world history from its own perspective:
The upheaval, in which we are standing, is enormous and not a matter of days or years…when we are prepar-
ing a new ground (Boden) for hundreds and thousands of years, it is scientifically necessary and self-evident,
that we also go back into the past with hundreds and thousands of years, not out of antiquarian and archeo-
logical interests, not out of a false historical neutrality and objectivity, but on the contrary, because every past
( jede Vergangenheit) obtains its light from the present.91
It is in this sense that Schmitt’s Nazi-era works after 1933 aim to tease out a novel genealogy of true
German concrete orders.92 This search for a new Nazi history is, at the same time, an attempt to
purify Germany from the ‘spiritual subjugation’ caused by the reception of Roman law and liberal
thinking. In an article published in 1934, which carries the descriptive name, ‘Unsere geistige Gesamt-
lage und unsere juristische Aufgabe’ (‘Our comprehensive spiritual situation and our juridical task’),
Schmitt writes:
Two great invasions of foreign law ( fremden Rechts) have infiltrated (eingedrungen) the German people and its
legal life (Rechtsleben): The reception of Roman law in the late Middle Ages and the reception of liberal con-
stitutionalism in the nineteenth century.93
According to Schmitt the influence of Roman law and liberal constitutionalism cannot be explained
as a natural exchange of ideas between neighbouring nations and peoples; in reality, they represent
nothing less than completely foreign ‘invasions’ (Einbrüche) and as such form a part of the
86Schmitt, ‘Nationalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat’, 713–4.
87Schmitt, ‘Der Weg des deutschen Juristen’, 692.
88Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, 28.
89Ibid., 41–2. The radicality of Schmitt’s statements in his Nazi works is often not taken at face value. For instance, in her otherwise
erudite work on Schmitt’s Weimar-era thought, Ellen Kennedy argues that Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazis could be described
as a shift from initially supporting a commissarial dictatorship during the tumultuous year of 1932 toward supporting a sovereign
dictatorship under Hitler during 1933 (Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 154–183, 223n12). Kennedy interprets Schmitt’s shift to
Nazism too directly from the perspective of his Weimar-era thought. Schmitt’s Nazi-writings explicitly emphasize that the
new concept of ‘leadershipness’ (Führertum) that defines the novel power-structure of the Nazi movement is not a form of dic-
tatorship of any kind, but rather an entirely new kind of constitutional concept based on the shared racial homogeneity of the
Führer and his ‘followership’ (Gefolgschaft) (Schmitt, ‘Der Neubau’, 250; Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, 42; this important seman-
tical change is also not recognized by Mehring, ‘Carl Schmitts Schrift “Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft”’, 866). On
Schmitt’s analysis of the Nazi-movement as a radically revolutionary power formation based on the concepts of Führertum and
Artgleichheit, see Suuronen, ‘Nazi Revolution.’
90Schmitt, Tagebücher 1925 bis 1929, 361–2; cf., 346; Schmitt, Der Schatten Gottes, 154–5, 168.
91Schmitt, ‘Die Rechtswissenschaft im Führerstaat’, 439.
92This is most fully performed in Schmitt, Über die drei Arten, 34ff.
93Schmitt, ‘Unsere geistige Gesamtlage und unsere juristische Aufgabe’, 11.
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comprehensive ‘spiritual subjugation’ (geistige Unterwerfung) of Germany. These foreign invasions
lead to the development of ‘foreign… conceptual-systems and thought-systems’ on German soil,
ultimately establishing the domination of ‘volksfremde Rechtssätze,’ legal propositions foreign to
the German people. Schmitt emphasizes that these non-German infiltrations had such a radical
effect on the development of German law that even the paradigmatic ‘type’ of a German jurist
was soon defined by these foreign traditions. The practical result was that the truly German concrete
order based on a ‘living and actual reality’ was replaced by an ‘abstract normativism’ that set the
measure for a supposedly scientific and ‘purely juristic’ way of thinking.94
As one specifically important example, Schmitt mentions the distinction of private and public law
that was bequeathed to modern continental legal systems through the reception of Roman law.95
However, as Schmitt emphasizes in his 1934 essay ‘National Socialist Legal Thinking,’ ultimately,
the task of Nazi lawyers is not to trace the singular non-German influences, but rather to prepare
the overcoming of a whole system of normativistic and anti-German deceptions. It is in this sense
that
The battle against the Roman law has a deeper meaning. It should not make us mere historians of law or bring
forth evidence that every single sentence of the Sachsenspiegel would be more correct than every single sentence
of the Corpus iuris. It is a battle against the after-effects and consequences of a process, which in its immense
scope is unparalleled, [and which] has changed the thought type of the Jurist (Denktypus des Juristen).96
Everything comes down to tracking and overcoming a specific ‘spiritual habitus’ and ‘a specific
juridical way of thinking’ that broke through in Germany through the influence of Roman law:
‘This is what we mean, when we say, that we are engaged in a battle against the Roman law.’97 It
is crucial to become conscious of the ‘loanwords and loan-thoughts’ that have separated the German
lawyer from the concrete German order and way of thinking ever since the 15th century. This devel-
opment saw its apex in the nineteenth century through the ‘influx of the Jewish guest-people
( jüdischen Gastvolkes)’ – a people that for thousands of years only lived ‘in law (Gesetz) and in
norm’ without a state of its own.98 By rethinking the fundamental legal concepts and thus freeing
herself from a foreign way of thinking, Germany and its new lawyers were now spearheading an epo-
chal revolution through which the German people and her allies would return ‘to their own soil
(Boden), to their own blood (Blut) and to the natural orders, that arise out of blood and soil (Blut
und Boden).’99
Schmitt specifies all of these arguments further in an essay entitled ‘The task and necessity of a
German estate of lawyers,’ published in 1936. In this text Schmitt pronounces that ‘the program
of the NSDAP is a true, and namely our most important source of law’; its substance has, by
1936, turned into ‘valid law’ and it defines the work of everyone, who is in any way connected to
questions related to law: the judge, the legislator, the legal scholar and the lawyer, who are now
all described as ‘German protectors of law (Rechtswahrer)’100 – a specifically Nazi term that was gen-
erally preferred over the ‘degenerated’ Latin-rooted ‘jurist.’101 Schmitt refers especially to the point
19 of the party programme and celebrates the fact that the received Roman law that had merely
served the interests of a ‘material world-order’ was now being overcome with a ‘German common
law’ (deutsches Gemeinrecht).102
94Ibid; cf. Carl Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 181. On the ‘ideal-type’ of the Roman jurists as ‘interchangeable people’ ( fun-
gibele personen), which Schmitt attacks here, see Giltaij, ‘Autonomy and Authority’.
95Schmitt, ‘Die Rechtswissenschaft im Führerstaat’, 435.




100Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 181.
101Chapoutot, The Law of Blood, 94ff.
102Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 181.
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Schmitt then moves on to describe German legal history as a battle between true Germanic law
and foreign Roman law, portraying all attempts at resisting the influence of the latter as heroic resist-
ance.103 The most important attempt at resisting Roman law had been undertaken by the germanis-
tische Rechtsschule during the nineteenth century. As especially important works from this tradition,
Schmitt names Georg Beseler’s Volksrecht und Juristenrecht (1843) that was written as a critique of
Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s and Georg Friedrich Puchta’s ‘reanimation of Romanistik’ and the first
volume of Otto von Gierke’s Genossenschaftsrecht (1868).104 Bringing his historical portrayal of this
Germanic tradition to the twentieth century, Schmitt also emphasizes the importance of Heinrich
Brunner and Karl von Amira as trailblazers of a specifically Germanic law. However, since the
efforts of all these jurists were unfortunately not supported by a strong political movement, they
remained powerless in the shadow of the ‘several-hundred-year-long domination of Roman recep-
tion-law (Rezeptionsrechts).’ Finally, the lost battle culminated to the publication of the 1896 Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch (BGB), coming into force in 1900, which despite of appearances continued to be
defined by the ideas of legal positivism and abstract normativism. Such lawyers as Erich Jung, Philipp
Heck and Ernst Stampe, who tried to resist this codification, still remained helpless and without
influence.105
Only the triumph of National Socialism in 1933 finally liberates Germany from this foreign sick-
ness. Drawing on this historical background, Schmitt formulates the revolutionary and purificatory
task of the coming Nazi legal science as follows: ‘The battle against Roman Rezeptionsrecht is a battle
against an estate of lawyers (Juristenstand) formed through a foreign law and [a battle] for a German
estate of lawyers (Juristenstand.)’106 Schmitt also emphasizes that in order to fully grasp the nature of
this historical battle, one must consider the specific infiltration of ‘Jewish scholars’ to Germany’s legal
life. To this extent, he announces in a footnote his intention of doing so in an upcoming conference
on ‘Jewishness in legal science,’ which Schmitt will organize later in 1936.107
Schmitt specifies his argument by stating that his battle against Rome is a battle against a specific
reception of Roman law, and not against Roman law in its entirety. Unlike the received version of
Roman law in Germany, Schmitt proclaims that a true Volksrecht was clearly present in the thought
of ‘the greatest jurists of classical Roman law.’108 With the NSDAP party programme as valid law and
with Hitler as the ‘highest judge of the nation,’ the deadly influence of the received and essentially
Jewish Roman law can now finally be overcome. It can now be perceived that the received Corpus
iuris was, in fact, nothing more than a feeble ‘Ersatz of a political unity’ that had replaced the real
political unity of Germany with an abstract and powerless unity of codified norms. This, again,
was conserved by the corpus iurisconsultorum at the German faculties of law.109
These same themes are analyzed in greater detail in Schmitt’s most comprehensive legal historical
essay from the early Nazi-era, ‘The historical situation of German legal science,’ published in 1936 in
the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, edited by Schmitt himself since May 1934. This essay explains in
much greater detail how ‘the German people has found its völkische Lebensordnung through the
Führer of the national socialist movement’ and elaborates what this means for the ‘German renewal
of law (deutschen Rechsterneuerung).’110 First, specifying his distinction between the deadly
103On Germanic and Roman law in the nineteenth century, see Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law, 205–9; On similar narratives
among Nazi thinkers, see Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht, 64–5.
104These praising remarks are contradictory to Schmitt’s 1930 essay on Hugo Preuss, in which Schmitt criticizes Gierke. See Schmitt,
‘Hugo Preuss’, 169–76. There is no doubt that this change is connected to what Michael Stolleis calls a ‘Gierke-Renaissance in
National Socialism’; Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht, 64 n28. However, see also Schmitt’s antisemitic remarks in relation to Gierke’s mar-
riage and children, in Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, 189.
105Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 181.
106Ibid., 182.
107Ibid., 181, fn1. For the deeply antisemitic conference proceedings, see Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft. For background,
see Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 372–8; Rüthers, Entartetes Recht, 125–42.
108Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 182. This was a wide-spread narrative among Nazi lawyers and also propagated by
Schmitt’s patron Hans Frank. See, Chapoutout, The Law of Blood, 53, 92–9; Chapoutot, ‘The Denaturalization of Nordic Law’.
109Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 182.
110Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Lage’, 15–6.
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reception of a liberal and inherently ‘Jewish’ science of Roman law and between true Roman law,
whose real substance had been lost for millennia before being recovered by the National Socialists,
Schmitt now declares:
The great times of legal science are by no means democratic ones nor times defined by the rule of law
(rechtsstaatliche) in the sense of the liberal concept of democracy or rule of law (Rechtsstaat). To the authority
of the famous Roman Jurisconsultus equipped with the jus respondendi belongs the authority of the Roman
Cesar Augustus, the auctoritas Divi Augusti (Dig. 2, 49) [sic].111
Although Schmitt is not drawing a direct parallel between Hitler and the Roman emperor, because
Schmitt emphasizes that the specifically Nazi notion of ‘leadershipness’ (Führertum) grounded on
racial homogeneity (Artgleicheit) has absolutely no historical precedents at all,112 Schmitt is neverthe-
less alluding that Nazi Germany has restored the glory of the true Volksrecht that had once been rea-
lized in Rome. Drawing on a long tradition of narratives, Schmitt implies that both in the golden era of
early Roman empire and in Nazi Germany the legal system is guaranteed by a strong ruler.113 Schmitt
now portrays the Nazi lawyer as a Rechtswahrer, a protector of law, who forms an essential part in the
defense of ‘völkisch orders’ threatened by ‘racially hostile powers (artfeindlichenMächten).’ It is in this
sense that the new German protector of law is a ‘vivid part of the concrete order and of the status,
whose law it must guard’; the German protector of law is the ‘true ratio status’ and a ‘vigens
disciplina.’114
Schmitt also specifies his distinction between the feeble ersatz unity created by the reception of
Roman law and the strong racial unity of the German people realized by the Nazi movement. Schmitt
maintains that German legal history is defined by the attempt to replace the latter with a mere
abstract Rechtsgemeinschaft, a fictive community of law that arose as temporary solution in a ‘pol-
itical vacuum’ devoid of true political unity. In order to illustrate this historical reality, Schmitt refers
to Rudolf Sohm’s 1874 article, ‘Deutsche Rechtsentwicklung und Kodifikation’ in which Sohm
argues that the reception of Roman law was not the reception of a Recht but the reception of
Rechtswissenschaft; or as Schmitt would have it, not a reception of a law in the sense of customs,
habits, concrete ways of life, but rather the reception of a lifeless, coded language that no longer
reflected the reality of former Roman glory:
In the centuries-long agony of the Holy Roman Empire the legal science in Germany helped to fill out a political
vacuum; it created a ‘common German law’ that in the lack of a political unity of Germany at least meant a type
of ‘legal community.’115
The lack of political unity found a feeble replacement in the abstract unity of a common legal science
represented by the Reichskammergericht. This court became the symbolical unifier of a weak Reich
that had been split into a heterogeneous mix of protestants and Catholics during the sixteenth
century. Forming an interesting contrast to Hannah Arendt’s later way of using the metaphor
of ‘dark times’,116 Schmitt refers to this era as a ‘murky time’ (trüben Zeit) and portrays this
court as the ‘hotbed of a political sickness’ and as the very symbol of a non-unified Germany.117
It is at this point that ‘the great success of the historical school of Savigny seemed to be the sole,
complete triumph of the science of jurisprudence.’ The influence of the historical school relied on the
political vacuum that existed in Germany. The received Roman law was nothing but an empty sur-
rogate, a helpless and life-less doctrine that came to define a politically despaired Germany. The his-
torical school of Savigny, ultimately, was destroyed by its infinite ‘self-contradictions.’ Historically,
111Ibid., 16. Schmitt (mis)cites this same passage from the Digest also in Schmitt, ‘Die Rechtswissenschaft im Führerstaat’, 436.
112Cf., Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, 41–2; Schmitt, ‘Kodifikation oder Novelle?’ 924.
113On the Roman emperor as the highest judge, which Schmitt mentions in this context, See, Tuori, The Emperor of Law. On positive
reappropriations of Roman imagery by the Nazis, cf., Chapoutot, Le nazisme et l’antiquité; Hell, The Conquest of Ruins, 307–400.
114Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Lage’, 16.
115Ibid., 17.
116See Arendt, ‘Gedanken zu Lessing’.
117Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Lage’, 17–8.
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Savigny’s science of jurisprudence ‘stands between the end of absolute Monarchy and the victory of
the national-liberal movement’ and its temporary achievement was the impressive creation of a
fictionally united Germany in this interim period. However, as Schmitt notes, Savigny’s historical
school did not find the way toward the German people and its ‘blood and soil’ (Blut und Boden),
but rather lead to the development of an abstract history of law that remained a matter of an edu-
cated bourgeoisie. For these reasons, the triumph of the historical school could not be anything but a
Scheinsieg.118
In the lack of a true political unity, Germany had been left to the hands of a ‘jüdisch-freimaurer-
isch geführten Liberalismus,’ a liberalism dominated by Jewish and freemasonic elements that came
to fully occupy the concept of science. By validating their political goals as supposedly objective
‘science,’ Jewish-freemasonic liberalism set out to ‘corrode the Prussian soldier state and bureau-
cratic state from within (von innen heraus zu zersetzen).’119 All of this could only be overcome
when Nazism would transform the abstract unity of Germany into a true racial unity. As Schmitt
now notes with a certain bitterness, the ‘last victory’ of this now outdated mode of thinking was
to be found in the Preussenschlag-trial in which Schmitt himself had defended the state and its
right of intervention. Schmitt then concludes by referring to Reinhard Höhn’s study ‘Rechtsge-
meinschaft und Volksgemeinschaft’ from 1935 as the seminal study that has demonstrated how
the problems of constitutional liberalism and its foreign traditions can be overcome.120
As Johann Chapoutot notes, in the texts of Nazi authors Roman Law is often ‘nothing but a straw
man set up for purposes of political condemnation.’121 While this certainly applies to Schmitt’s his-
torical revisionism as well, Schmitt’s anti-Roman discourse also served more specific polemical and
rhetorical purposes. First, Schmitt’s radical self-distancing from the historical imagery related to
Rome is also a self-distancing from Italian fascism that he still admired in his late Weimar-era writ-
ings. Fascism and its strong ‘total state’ is now gradually replaced with the much more extreme ethos
of the Nazi Revolution and its racist imagery of Blut und Boden. It is surprisingly rarely understood
that Schmitt’s move from decisionism to concrete order thought also mirrors the shift of his own
political position from that of an authoritarian thinker who idealized Italian fascism toward becom-
ing a racist Nazi.122
Second, through his interpretation of Roman law from the Nazi perspective, Schmitt was also
engaged in a polemical debate with the romanists of his era. As Kaius Tuori shows in his recent
work, for romanists critical of the Nazi regime, the history of Roman law had started to function
as a kind of a ‘surrogate arena’ for political debates in which they could express political opinions
indirectly.123 Schmitt’s analysis of Roman law stands in an especially polemical relationship to the
works of the romanist Fritz Schulz. Schmitt was actively engaged in the ousting of both Schulz and
the Jewish legal scholar Erich Kaufmann from the university of Berlin, where Schmitt became anOrdi-
narius on the first of October 1933.124 Not surprisingly, Schmitt also had an extremely negative con-
ception of Schulz’s 1934 book Prinzipien des Römischen Rechts that sought to mobilize Roman law as
an antidote to the Nazi legal science.125 Referring to Schulz in particular and to Jewish-liberal authors
in general, Schmitt lamented the ‘individualistic and internationalist undermining’ of Germany
118Ibid., 18–9.
119Ibid., 16. Schmitt made similar arguments in his diaries as early as 1932, see Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930–1934, 415–6.
120Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Lage’, 18. Although the SS member Höhn was influenced by Schmitt still at this point, he would soon
be instrumental in Schmitt’s ousting from party offices. See Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 661ff.
121Chapoutot, ‘The Denaturalization of Nordic Law’, 123.
122In fact, Schmitt carefully distinguishes the non-racist political system of fascist Italy from the axiomatically racist system of Nazi
Germany. See especially Schmitt, ‘Faschistische und nationalsozialistische Rechtswissenschaft’; Schmitt, ‘I caratteri essenziali dello
Stato nazionalsocialista’; Schmitt, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Gesetzgebung’.
123See Tuori, Empire of Law, 21, 76, 149, 170, 228.
124Gräfin von Lösch, Der nackte Geist, 183–90, 197, 201–7.
125Schmitt and Huber, Briefwechsel, 205–8. See also the extremely negative review of Schulz’s book in Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung,
edited by Schmitt and mentioned by him positively in the aforementioned letters to Huber; Lange, ‘Deutsche Romanistik?’ On
Schmitt and Schulz more generally, see Tuori, Empire of Law.
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undertaken by ‘racially foreign authors,’ who had been allowed to portray their opinions as ‘unbiased
science.’126
Schmitt also debated the matter with the Romanist Fritz Pringsheim, who in an open letter asked
Schmitt about his one-sided and fully negative estimation of received Roman law. Schmitt, in
response, simply referred to his ‘scientific publications’ and noted that he would not be ‘interrogated’
on the matter by the likes of Pringsheim.127 All of this was of course in perfect harmony with
Schmitt’s celebration of the expulsion of Jewish scholars from Germany128 and with his fierce sup-
port for the aryanization of Germany’s public life through the process of Gleichschaltung.129
4. Finding another Rome during World War II: Roman law as the basis for a
European legal science
The hostile rhetoric against the reception of Roman law that dominates Schmitt’s Nazi writings from
1933 to 1936 progressively evolves toward more historically oriented analysis after Schmitt’s down-
fall in the ranks of the Nazi party in late 1936.130 Especially important in this sense are three of
Schmitt’s legal historical works from the early 1940s, ‘Das ‘Allgemeine Deutsche Staatsrecht’’
(1940) and ‘Die Formung des französischen Geistes durch den Legisten’ (1942), and finally his
short book Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft (1943/44).131 All of these examine in detail
the historical development of Western liberalism in Germany and Europe, focusing especially on the
reception of Roman law. In this section, I will analyze the most important of these three studies in
detail – Schmitt’s 1943/44 book on European legal science – and augment its historical insights by
drawing from the two other essays when necessary.
The historical context that animates all of these writings is of course WorldWar II. This context is
especially relevant to Schmitt’s 1943/44 book, because it is during 1942 and 1943 that Schmitt begins
to see that Germany will lose the war. The European ‘large space’ (Grossraum) dominated by the
hegemonic empire (Reich) of Nazi Germany that Schmitt had envisioned in his 1939/1941 book
on the Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung now begins to wither away as the tide of the war turns
against the invading German armies in the East.132 Already in the 1920s, Schmitt had seen that
after World War I we had entered an epoch that was an ‘intermediary state’ in which the old con-
cepts bound to the concept of the state were retained although they no longer reflected the actual
political reality.133 The world divided into several large spaces had been Schmitt’s answer to the
decay of the Westphalian balance of powers that had established the concept of the state as the
self-evident ‘image of order that dominates everything.’134
In a highly symbolical move, Schmitt’s writings on the Grossraum had cited Vergil’s famous
words from one of his Eclogues to describe the dawn of a new world order that would be realized
by the Nazi Reich: Ab integro nascitur ordo.135 This is Schmitt’s own abbreviation from Vergil’s
126Schmitt, ‘Die geschichtliche Lage’, 16–7. Here Schmitt draws his arguments from Lange’s hostile review of Schulz’s book and
from another essay in which the Jewish appropriation of science in described in detail; Lange, ‘Der Verfall des
Persönlichkeitsgedankens’.
127Pringsheim, ‘Die Haltung der Freiburger Studenten’. Schmitt notes the reception of this letter: ‘Angst vor den Juden (Brief Pring-
sheim)’ (Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930–1934, 312).
128Schmitt, ‘Die deutschen Intellektuellen’.
129Schmitt, ‘Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution’.
130On Schmitt’s downfall, compare Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 651–764; Blasius, Preussischer Sraatsrat, 153–80; Mehring, Aufstieg
und Fall, 378–80. On the closely connected accelerating meaninglessness of legal science in general, especially after 1938, see
Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, 317–50.
131On the various versions of this work see Mehring, ‘Carl Schmitts Schrift “Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft”’, 855–9.
On the differences between the 1943/44 version and the published version from 1950, which I use here, see Schmitt and Smend,
Briefwechsel 1921–1961, 113–5, fn387.
132On Schmitt’s international thought, see Odysseos and Petito, Carl Schmit; Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s international thought; Minca and
Rowan, On Schmitt and Space.
133Pankakoski, ‘Intermediate State’.
134Schmitt, ‘Staat als ein konkreter’, 376.
135Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, 306.
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lines, magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo, ‘the great order of the ages is born anew.’136 How-
ever, with the Nazi defeat on the Eastern front, Schmitt begins to see that the Nazi expansion would
not lead to a world divided into different Monroe-doctrines and large spaces. The era of European
hegemony was now inevitably coming to its end.
This crucial turning point in the global political situation leads Schmitt to perform another inter-
esting volte-face in his use of classical imagery and history. Schmitt not only abandons his highly
political use of Vergil’s lines, which according to Reinhard Mehring were nothing less than Schmitt’s
‘motto’ in the 1930s and 1940s,137 but also develops an entirely new reading of the history of Roman
law. Whereas Schmitt’s Nazi-era writings from the 1930s paint the reception of Roman law as a weed
that needed to be rooted out in the name of the Nazi-revolution, in the early 1940s, by contrast,
Schmitt begins to develop a theory of a shared European legal past, which is nourished by a highly
positive image of the reception of Roman law. This turn is performed in Schmitt’s pamphlet The
State of European Legal Science (which already in its title emphasizes Europe and thus appears in
an interesting contradiction to Schmitt’s 1936 essay ‘The historical situation of German legal
science’) and partially anticipated in the two other essays mentioned above.
Schmitt opens his book on European legal science by emphasizing two factors that seem to make
the very idea of a common European legal science impossible. First, the ‘political disunity (Zerrissen-
heit) of Europe’ caused by the two great world wars, and second, the dominance of legal positivism
that is grounded on the pluralistic particularity of different national legal systems.138 However,
Schmitt argues that there is more to European legal history than the restricted historical gaze of
legal positivism allows one to see. Abandoning his former description of the reception of Roman
law as an unnatural ‘invasion,’ Schmitt now begins to argue that ‘the whole history of law and the
development of law of the European peoples is for a thousand years a history of reciprocal recep-
tions.’ If this history is understood in the right way, Schmitt argues, one can discover ‘a true Euro-
pean community, whose shared law (gemeinsames Recht) bears the features of a true common law.’139
In a glaring contradiction to his earlier arguments on the subject, Schmitt now maintains that the
heart of this historical development is formed by ‘the great, centuries long event of confrontation of
legal history, the ‘reception of Roman Law’.’ The ‘rebirth of Roman Law in the Middle-Ages’ and the
reception of the Corpus Juris Justiniani is a revolutionary event of ‘European-wide meaning.’140 This
reception forms the shared European ‘cultural structure’ constituted by a specific ‘European spirit.’
Through the reception of Roman law, this cultural edifice laid the basis for ‘a model of juridical
thinking (Gedankenarbeit),’ a ‘shared vocabulary’ based on the Latin language, and thus, ultimately
a kind of a ‘spiritual and conceptual (gedanklich) Common Law of Europe.’141
It is important to emphasize that Schmitt’s essay obviously does not advocate the resurrection of
Roman law as a received system of norms. Schmitt emphasizes that all ‘reactionary turnarounds’ and
attempts at deriving legitimate codifications from received law in the style of the Pandektenwis-
senschaft have lost their validity for good.142 ‘We know that there is no restauration of bygone his-
torical situations. A historical truth is only true once.’143 Unlike Paul Koschaker, who argued in his
Die Krise des römischen Rechts und die romanistische Rechtswissenschaft (1938) that the crisis of
modern legal science must be located precisely to the fact that the received ius commune had lost
its validity with the introduction of the new Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in 1900, Schmitt fully abandons
the notion that received law could provide any direct solutions. Unlike Koschaker, Schmitt argues
that the fact that Roman law no longer has direct validity on the twentieth century legal systems
136This forms an interesting contrast with the opposite way Hannah Arendt would use Vergil’s same words in her description of the
American constitutional model. See Arendt, On Revolution, 171, 202–4.
137On Schmitt’s uses of Vergil, see Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 247, 274, 396–7.
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of Europe is but a small portion of the true crisis of legal science that goes beyond the narrow limits
of particular legal codifications.144
What the history of Roman law and its reception provides, Schmitt maintains, is a ‘tremendous
wealth of new insights’ that one can and must ‘take over creatively (gestaltend bemächtigen).’145 To
explain the relevance of this shared legal past for contemporary politics, Schmitt renarrates modern
European legal history and presents an original interpretation of the roots of the contemporary legal
and political crisis.
Schmitt begins by portraying the birth of European legal science through the reception of Roman
law as the very first step in the development of what he calls ‘occidental rationalism.’ The first ‘trail-
blazers’ and ‘great revolutionaries’ of this rationalism were the early legists, the experts of Roman law
in the early middle-ages, who helped to animate a broader rebirth of Roman law in the twelfth, thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries through their commentaries.146 In a fierce battle with the Church
and its canonical law, these thinkers managed to assert the position of legal science as a separate fac-
ulty. Through their efforts, Roman law gradually came to influence and define the juridical language
of all European nations.147 With the Renaissance, European legal science then witnessed a golden age
that was, simultaneously, also an era of bloody confessional civil wars. It was in this era that Europe
witnessed the birth of modern constitutional law (Staatsrecht) and its most central concept, sover-
eignty. This development is signalled above all by French thinkers, in particular by Jean Bodin and
his famous Les Six Livres de la République (1576).148
Schmitt argues that the crisis of occidental rationalism centered around the notions of the state
and sovereignty begins with the development of legal positivism during the Enlightenment period.
The crucial historical ‘turning point’ is marked by the Spring of Nations in 1848 after which liberal-
ism and legal positivism gradually take hold in all European countries. Gradually, the ius naturale of
preceding generations is replaced by the positivistic idea of ‘progress’ and law is reduced to a mere
‘majority decision’ and to an ‘unclear compromise of heterogeneous party coalitions.’149 In this way,
legitimate sovereignty becomes undermined and obscured. In the twentieth century, this crisis accel-
erates in an unforeseen way, especially after World War I, as the ‘practice of law-making becomes
ever more simplified and ever more accelerated.’150 In Weimar Germany, this is evident in the mis-
use of the article 48 as a law making practice for purposes not justified by the Weimar constitution,
such as pushing through major financial and economic decisions.151 Finally, we arrive at a moment
when law is now nothing more than a ‘motorized’ vehicle of ‘planning’ and bureaucratic misuse that
no longer requires no sovereign legitimacy at all to be used for any imaginable purpose.152 Through
this legal historical narrative, Schmitt not only criticizes modern legal positivism, but also National
Socialism that is now implicitly portrayed as the ultimate and most extreme consequence of the for-
mer. Similarly, already in 1942 Schmitt had blamed the United States for the outbreak of World War
II, describing it as an ‘accelerator against its own will’ – a description derived from the supposed
betrayal to the more original doctrine of isolation and limited empire; the Monroe Doctrine.153
Although Schmitt now repeats the central historical arguments at the heart of his former Nazi era
works on legal history, Schmitt now recalibrates his analysis of modern legal positivism and its
relationship to Roman law in an interesting way. Instead of simply pointing to the modern reception
of Roman law as a virus that is inextricably bound with the development of modern ‘Jewish’
144Ibid., 394. Schmitt nevertheless calls Koschaker the ‘master’ (Ibid) and the ‘definitive authority’ on the subject; see Schmitt, ‘Das
‘Allgemeine Deutsche Staatsrecht’’, 167. On Koschaker and Roman law, see Beggio, Paul Koschaker.
145Schmitt, Die Lage, 416.
146Ibid, 421.
147Ibid., 421–2, 392; cf., Schmitt, ‘Legisten’, 187–8, 193–4.
148Schmitt, Die Lage, 422.
149Ibid., 397–8, 402. On the crucial importance of 1848 for Schmitt, see Carl Schmitt, ‘Lorenz von Stein’.
150Schmitt, Die Lage, 404.
151Ibid., 405.
152Ibid., 407.
153Carl Schmitt, ‘Beschleuniger wider Willen’.
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liberalism as such, Schmitt now offers a more nuanced treatment by distinguishing between the
different legal receptions of England, France and Germany. While the legal praxis of England had
gradually developed into case law defined by legal precedents, France provides the historical example
for the continental state that in distinction to England and its localization of law to a separate legal
profession and court system, monopolized law-making power to its own hands, becoming the typical
example of what Schmitt calls a Der zentralisierte Gesetzesstaat.154 Turning not only against these
two models but also against the ‘motorized’ and permanent state of exception in Hitler’s Germany,
Schmitt argues that German legal history provides another path for conceptualizing a pan-European
political entity. Performing an astonishing turn around, Schmitt now portrays Savigny and his his-
torical school as the pioneers of the European Grossraum.
Although Savigny’s attempts had failed in the nineteenth century because of the prevailing liberal
constitutionalism, this does not affect the ‘actuality’ and the ‘European meaningfulness’ of his unique
approach.155 Savigny’s ideas are ‘more actual today than during the time of their emergence.’156
Schmitt’s rediscovery of Savigny is his answer to the problem that he formulated in his other
legal historical works from the early 1940s, especially to the fact that ‘the German legal science,
ever since Bodin, no longer knew the Reich, only the state.’157 It is in this sense that Schmitt prophe-
sized the ‘restoration’ of the concept of the Reich over the state already in his 1940 essay on the his-
tory of German legal thought.158 Similarly, Schmitt’s 1942 essay on the French legists had sought to
demonstrate how the concepts of the state and sovereignty were a specifically French creation, ‘the
classical political achievement of the French spirit.’159 Creating a historical foil for his own theory the
Grossraum, Schmitt argued that the French nation and its ideal model of the sovereign state had
failed precisely at the moment when it was confronted ‘with the task of a European Grossraum-
order.’160 Although the French spirit had created the central concepts of modern constitutional the-
ory that eventually took hold in all of Europe, this state-bound way of thinking had ‘not discovered
the way to the European Grossraum.’ It is in this sense that Schmitt ended his 1942 essay on the
French legists with the prophetical proclamation: ‘This time around the order will be won through
Germany and the Reich’; ‘what comes, is our new Reich.’161
These prophetic declarations acquire a deeper historical foundation in Schmitt’s book on Euro-
pean legal science from 1943/44. While the French had theorized the state, it was the German tra-
dition spearheaded by Savigny that would open up the way for conceptualizing the German Reich
and its hegemonic European Grossraum by discovering a shared and organic pan-European legal
history. In distinction to the case law system in England and to the state-bound model of France,
Schmitt argues that the historical school of Savigny opens up a European Sonderweg of legal
thought and allows one to image legal science itself as the true ‘protector of law (Rechtswah-
rerin).’162 For this way of thinking, the ultimate source of law is found in the organic historical
development of law itself: For Savigny and his historical school ‘the science of law is namely itself
the true source of law.’163 What Savigny’s thinking realizes is the fact that ‘the law (Recht) as a
concrete order cannot be separated from its history. True law (Recht) is not posited, but rather
develops in an unintentional development.’164 When Schmitt argues in this way that the true ‘ori-
gin’ (Ursprung) of law is to be found in its own history and tradition – from something pre-given
154Schmitt, Die Lage, 414.
155Ibid., 415.
156Ibid., 408.
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and not intentionally posited – he implicitly criticizes both legal positivism and Nazism of which
neither recognizes such an origin.165
While Schmitt’s earlier Nazi-era writings had said nothing positive about Savigny, when the Nazi
empire begins to crumble down after the failure of Operation Barbarossa, Schmitt now apologetically
mobilizes Savigny’s thought in order to salvage what is still left of his own vision of a European
Grossraum. Whereas Schmitt’s earlier Nazi-era texts described Savigny’s historical school skeptically
as a failed ‘reanimation of Romanistik’ and criticized the Herderian theory of the Volksgeist that ani-
mates and underlies Savigny’s ideas,166 in 1943/44 Savigny is portrayed as nothing less than the
‘paradigm’167 and as a European ‘katechon,’168 whose thought allows Schmitt to outline the basis
for a new European legal science. If one would make a list of great Europeans, Schmitt proclaims,
there would be ‘very few names’ that would deserve inclusion like ‘the name Friedrich Carl von
Savigny,’ who is now celebrated as ‘the renewer of the science of Roman law,’ as the ‘leader… of
a historical school’ and as the ‘founder of modern private international law.’169 It is Savigny, who
now allows us to see how European legal science itself has turned into the ‘last asylum of law
(Rechts).’170
If in 1936 Schmitt still lamented that it was precisely Roman law that had reduced the European
community to a unity of substantiveless norms and thus created a weak ‘ersatz’ community171, by
1943/44 Schmitt came to think that even such an ‘abstract’ unity is better than no unity at all.
Thus, falling back on the idea of a shared European legal past, Schmitt falls back on an idea that
he himself had formerly denounced. Most astonishingly, Schmitt even implicitly acknowledges
this in his book by referring to the fact that ‘the quarrel for and against the science [of Roman
law]…was disputed with the greatest intensity precisely in Germany in the years after 1933 from
all possible perspectives.’172 What Schmitt leaves unmentioned, however, is that not only had he
himself participated actively in these debates after 1933, but that his own interpretation and under-
standing of Roman law had, by 1943, changed completely.173 From being a foreign virus within
Germany, it had now transformed to the shared history of the ‘concrete order’ of Europe and formed
nothing less than the very historical core of what Schmitt called Europe’s concrete ‘localization’ and
‘ordering’ in his Grossraum theory.174 Abandoning his Nazi distinction between the golden era of
Roman law that was lost with the ‘Jewish’ reception of the science of Roman law, Schmitt now reca-
librates his attack toward a particular interpretation of Roman Law – the positivist-liberal one – that
has been harmful and which has prohibited the Europeans and Germans from seeing the actual and
fundamental importance of true Roman law. In this way, Roman law now transforms into nothing
less than the shared historical basis on the which European unity can still be imagined after the fail-
ure of the Nazi invasion to the East.175
165Ibid.
166Schmitt, ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit,’ 181–2.
167Schmitt, Die Lage, 408.
168This remark is from the new endnotes Schmitt added in 1958. Schmitt, Die Lage, 427–9; cf., Schmitt, ‘Kodifikation’, 920. Although
this is beyond the reach of this study, it is important to note that the concept of the Katechon emerges to Schmitt’s thinking
roughly during the same period (in 1942) when Schmitt is engaged in the process of revising his understanding concerning
the history of Roman law and its reception. On Schmitt’s theory of the Katechon, cf., Hell, The Conquest of Ruins, 401–30; Suuronen
‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Biotechnology and Utopias’.
169Schmitt, Die Lage, 409.
170Ibid., 408.
171Schmitt ‘Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit’, 182; Schmitt, ‘Die Geschichtliche Lage’, 18.
172Schmitt, Die Lage, 392–3.
173Schmitt was of course not alone in performing such a turnaround in the early 1940s. For instance, Stolleis mentions Georg Dahm
and Franz Wieacker as major examples. See, Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht, 87–9.
174Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, 319; cf., Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, 13–20.
175All this shows how misleading it is to argue that Schmitt’s apologetic 1943/44 book would demonstrate that he never truly
embraced Nazism, as has been argued among others by Christian Tilitzki, who uses Schmitt’s 1943/44 book to draw an absolute
contrast between Schmitt and the biologically racist viewpoint of SS-men like Reinhard Höhn (Tilitzki, ‘Carl Schmitt’, 65–7). Tilitzki
ignores the changes in Schmitt’s positions, does not mention the fact that Schmitt cited Höhn’s works positively in his Nazi writ-
ings, nor does he acknowledge the fact that before the SS publicly attacked Schmitt in the articles published in Das schwarze
Korps, Schmitt had been Höhn’s academic supporter (see Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 661–71; cf., Stolleis, Geschichte des
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5. In conclusion: classical images for present politics
Schmitt was aware that he used Roman imagery and history as a situational-polemical instrument
that gained new interpretations in new political contexts. As Schmitt notes in his 1943/44 book:
‘Every new spiritual current of the European spirit has led to new, unexpected facets of perception
of Roman law.’176 Acceptingly citing the famous words of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to his per-
sonal secretary Johann Peter Eckermann, also Schmitt likened Roman law to ‘a duck that dives under
water and may every now and again hide away, but never fully disappears and always on some
occasion resurfaces vividly.’177
In this essay I have examined how Schmitt’s usage of Roman law surfaces and resurfaces,
transforms and develops from his early book on Roman Catholicism to his treatment of this
topic in his 1943/44 book on European legal science. As we have seen, Schmitt first mobilized
the vocabulary of traditions and the image of Roman universalism to defend the Catholic Church
against Russian nihilism, before gradually transposing and remobilizing these same historical
vocabularies in a romantic defense of the total state of Mussolini. It is already at this point
that Schmitt himself acknowledges the chameleon-like nature of his own uses of Roman history,
when he acceptingly cites words of the French playwright Pierre Corneille: ‘Rome n’est plus dans
Rome, elle est toute ou je suis,’ Rome is no longer in Rome, she is here where I am.178 As
Schmitt’s political position undergoes a shift, the imagery of Rome changes as well. True
Rome is wherever Carl Schmitt is.
By the Spring of 1933, the time was again ripe for another transformation. As we have seen,
when Schmitt joined the Nazis, he also distanced himself from his former positive espousal of
Roman imagery and symbolics. As if retrospectively acknowledging this himself, Schmitt
would later describe his own abandonment of the constitutional framework of Weimar’s
Rechtsstaat in 1932/1933 as his own ‘crossing of the Rubicon,’ thus making an implicit allusion
to Lucan’s Pharsalia and Caesar’s famous defiance of the Republican constitution.179 When
Schmitt abandoned the Weimar Republic in favour of the new Nazi Empire during 1933, he
also distanced himself from the republican history that the legal practice and constitution of Wei-
mar still implicitly carried with it. In the name of the ‘German Revolution,’ Schmitt’s historical
imagery turned against the ‘Jewish’ reception of Roman law that was contrasted with the
untainted golden age of true Roman ‘Volksrecht.’ All of this shows how deeply problematic it
is to argue that Schmitt would have never embraced the more racist tendencies of Nazism180
or that Schmitt always remained an essentially Catholic thinker.181
Finally, engaging in a half-hearted and a deeply apologetic denazification of his own thinking,
Schmitt once again began to recalibrate his use of classical imagery as it became clear that Germany
would lose World War II. Analyzing Schmitt’s 1943/44 book, I showed how Schmitt mobilized the
history of Roman law and Savigny’s historical school as vehicles for rethinking the European com-
munity – an endeavour in which thinkers like Koschaker and Wieacker were also engaged in
öffentlichen Rechts, 327–9). However, this also does not mean that there would be no difference between Schmitt and the
younger generation of SS-intellectuals, whose overtly revolutionary tendencies Schmitt criticized by 1936 (see Schmitt, ‘I caratteri
essenziali dello Stato nazionalsocialista’, 18; cf., Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 667). On the worldview of the younger SS-intellec-
tuals, which diverged from Schmitt’s, see Christian Ingrao, Believe and Destroy.
176Schmitt, Die Lage, 393.
177Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe, 74–5; Schmitt, Die lage, 394.
178Schmitt and Smend, Briefwechsel 1921–1961, 28.
179This is shown by Blasius, Preussischer Staatsrat, 69–70. This seems to be corroborated by the fact that Schmitt explicitly notes in
his diaries during early December 1932 that he no longer sees the Reichstag as the representative of the people in the sense of
the Weimar constitution. See, Schmitt, Tagebücher 1930–1934, 242, 244fn1273. In fact, Schmitt also uses the metaphor of the
Rubicon in 1935 to describe the radical novelty of the Nazimovement in distinction to the less radical fascist state in Italy; Schmitt,
‘Die Rechtswissenschaft im Führerstaat’, 439. The same metaphor is also used by Schmitt’s commentators in a descriptive sense.
See Koenen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, 85–172; Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 138, 164; Mehring, Aufstieg und Fall, 313.
180Most comprehensive arguments of this kind: Bendersky, Theorist for the Reich, 208; Koenen, Der Fall, 728.
181Eg, Koenen, Der Fall; Hell, The Conquest of Ruins; Meier, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts; Faber, Lateinischer Faschismus.
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different ways. Schmitt’s vision of a shared European legal history was a vision through which
Schmitt was now explicitly obscuring and perhaps even implicitly denouncing his own earlier espou-
sals of Nazi-ideology.182 It is in this complex process that one also discovers the often neglected roots
to Schmitt’s turn toward a historical philosophy of nomos, in which the discourse of traditions and
concrete orders is fused with a historical ‘battle over Rome’183 and to Schmitt’s later dubious claims
according to which Rom and Raum are – in their original historical-etymological fusing of ‘localiz-
ation’ and ‘ordering’ – the very same word.184
In his postwar writings and notebooks, Schmitt would go on to imply that it was not only him,
who was in ‘exile’ in Plettenberg, but rather the whole of European legal science: ‘1. The Europ[ean].
Science of law is the last refuge (Asyl) of law. 2. The Europ[ean]. Science of law is currently in
exile. 3. We belong to the exile government.’185 Emphasizing himself as an outsider, Schmitt
would once again cite Corneille: ‘My legal science is in exile… Rome n’est plus dans Rome, elle est
toute ou je suis.’186 It was not merely the old Nazi Carl Schmitt, who had been forced to take refuge
in ‘San Casciano – Plettenberg,’ but Rome itself. Calling his hometown of Plettenberg ‘San Casciano’
was a conscious analogy, first, to the forced exile of Niccolò Machiavelli, who had also been turned
down by the rulers he had striven to legitimate,187 and second, to Saint Cassian of Imola, who had
been betrayed by his own students and condemned to death.188
These kind of self-mythologizations obviously served an apologetic purpose. As Schmitt
acknowledges in his Glossarium, creating nicknames for himself was his own way of answering
to his so-called ‘persecutors’ in the postwar context: ‘Because I define so well, I must also at one
point compile a collection of self-definitions and set them against the countless foreign
definitions.’189 Referring to himself as a ‘Roman’ was Schmitt’s ingenious rhetorical strategy that
allowed him to weave in a non-existing continuity into his own works. By retrospectively portray-
ing himself as an essentially Christian political theologian, whose political positions had supposedly
remained constant ever since his early book on Catholicism from 1923, Schmitt could imply that
he was never a racist Nazi.190
However, as we have seen, in actual reality, Schmitt was a fiercely devoted Nazi at least from
1933 to 1936 and even beyond. For him, Roman imagery and history were not the unchanging
tradition that animated his supposedly continuous Christian political theology, but rather simply
a Benjaminian treasure trove of citations devoid of fixed meaning. From the 1920s to the 1940s,
Schmitt deployed this reserve of narratives and images for a broad array of contradictory purposes:
For the defense of a Christian Europe and the total state; then, by using Roman law as a negative
foil for the legitimization of Nazi rule in Germany, and finally, as the justificatory historical back-
ground for a shared European legal science. In all these instances, Rome was wherever Carl
Schmitt was.
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